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This book is an outgrowth of its writer's discussion of Instinct
and Intelligence in the Symposium held on those subjects in
London in IQIO (cf. British Journal of Psychology, 3, 1910, 219).
In the first half of the book the writer discusses the "nature
of instinctive behavior and its accompanying instinctive experi-
ence," and then, in the second half he goes on to present a
doctrine of experience, which he regards as the necessary out-
ccme of his theory of instinct, and to which he brings support
fiom many quarters. The views of McDougall, Myers, Stout,
and Piiesch aie repeatedly discussed throughout the volume,
while, in addition to other numerous references, an entire chapter
(Chap. VII) is devoted to Bergson's philosophy of instinct. The
whole presentation has a much more directly logical and episte-
mological, and a much less directly psychological, bearing, than
the title and the author's name would lead one to expect.
The first two chapters are devoted to the discussion of instinct
and of instinctive behavior. The latter is said to be "congeni-
tally determined" and "practically serviceable on the occasion
of its first performance" (p. 22), whereas the former is instinc-
tive behavior together with the experience that is correlated
with it. Although "practically serviceable," instinct is not
perfect, and from the first it is subject to modification by intel-
ligence. Intelligence is distinct from instinct with regard to
meaning, for the successive phases of the instinctive process in
its first occurrence possess "primary meaning," inherent in
their mere succession, while upon repetition of the process there
is anticipation or "pre-perception" of the as yet unrealized
phases by revival of the first occurrence,—an anticipation which
supplies "secondary meaning" to the process and characterizes
it as intelligent. A vaguely conscious "pre-perception" may
accompany the first occurrence of the instinctive performance,
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instinct and intelligence thus occurring together from the very
first, and being separated only by abstraction.
The distinction between instinct and intelligence is made
more concrete by reference to the nervous processes involved
(Chap. III). The author finds three kinds of behavior: (i) the
reflex, which is unconscious and is correlated with processes in
the spinal cord; (2) instinctive behavior, which involves "suf- '
fused awareness" and is connected with processes in the sub-
cortical centers, and (3) intelligent behavior, which is antici-
patory and is confined to cortical processes. He reviews the
work of Sherrington, Foster, Schrader, Goltz, and Pagano, and
bases his conclusions upon the differences in behavior between
normal, decerebrate, and spinal animals.
In Chapter IV we are told of "innate tendencies" or "inher-
ited dispositions," which are due to "congenital connections in
cortical centers;" just as instinctive behavior is dependent upon
"congenital connections in sub-cortical centeis." There are a
large number of innate tendencies, which include inherited
capacities for acquirement. The vague "pre-perception," which
accompanies the first occurrence of instinctive behavior, is due
to an hereditary cortical disposition.
The next two chapters deal with the nature of experience and
its relation to natural history. Experience, both as "that which
may be experience and as the process of experiencing,'' is held
to be everywhere interrelated and to be grotmded throughout
in nature. The unitariness of all experience is not violated by
the appearance of new orders in history, for these, although
unpredictable, are merely new syntheses in experience.
The last chapter is entitled "Finalism and Mechanism." The
writer defends mechanism in the sense that all natural processes
are determined and can be correlated. He does not hold, how-
ever, that any piocess can be expressed in terms of any other
process, and distinguishes four principles of interpretation,—
mechanical, mechanistic (physical and chemical), organic, and
psychological. The first two,—possibly the first three,—it may
perhaps be possible to merge; the last quite probably must
remain distinct. Finalism is accepted only in such cases as
involve anticipatory consciousness.
On the whole, the author has succeeded in giving a clear, if
sometimes repetitious, presentation of his own doctrine of "the
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intra-mundane philosophy of experience." One could wish,
howevei, that the presentation were a little less personal, that
it contained fewer references to several oi the author's asso-
ciates, and more references to less immediate philosophical
sources. To pass over the doctrines of interactionism and psycho-
physical parallelism in half a dozen pages seems haidly fair.
One wonders, also, whether a discussion of instinct is the best
starting-point for the piesentation of a doctrine of experience.
The first four chapters might be more intelligible it the}' fol-
lowed the last four; and at best it is a question whether there
is any gain in presenting the two topics, instinct and experience,
in the same volume.
In the discussion of instinct, one is prone to question repeat-
edly the positive correlation of mental and neuial processes.
Even granting all the other correlations and the necessity for
the "pre-perception " with the first instinctive performance,—a
concession which it is not likely that most critics would make,—
one is still inclined to wonder in just what way the "pre-percep-
tive disposition" is proven to be cortical. And yet it is on this
fact that the whole theory of instinct depends.
